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LIABILITY FOR GLOBAL NAVIGATION
SATELLITE SERVICES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF GPS AND GALILEO
Frans G. uon der Dunk*
I. INTRODUCTION:
GLOBAL
NAVIGATION
SATELLITE
SERVICES
AND LIABILITY
The law relating to global navigation satellite systems,
(GNSS) is a novel and complex subject. As a result, this paper
addresses a considerable number of issues from a new, as of yet
untested legal perspective. It will also address a number of altogether new issues which, from a legal perspective, have been
dealt with often in other areas of law.
Global navigation satellite systems are being used for a
very rapidly growing plethora of applications and, thus, also
cause a rapidly growing plethora of legal issues to arise. These
range from general institutional and jurisdictional ones, to such
concrete aspects as certification, security, intellectual property
rights and data protection. These issues, moreover, firstly, interplay with each other; secondly, do so a t various levels (international/global, to some extent European, that is European
Community, and national); and thirdly, do so in a number of
respects across a number of economic sectors, transport and
non-transport.
To address relevant legal issues, this paper will lay out the
essence of a global navigation satellite system, how it basically
operates at an abstract and non-technical level, and then will
chart specific legal ramifications onto this analysis.
The first economic sector to acknowledge the potential
benefits of global navigation satellite systems (timing, positioning and navigation-related services) was indeed a transport sec-

Dr. Frans G. von der Dunk is Co-Director of the International Institute of Air and
Space Law a t Leiden University, The Netherlands. He has been involved in many GNSS
- and Galileo - related study projects as Legal Advisor or Legal Task Manager, including
the GALILEI Study Cluster which finalised its work in July 2003.
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tor: aviation. In 1983 the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) established a Committee on Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS)' which inter alia was to identify possible
benefits, risks and drawbacks of the use of global navigation
satellite systems for aviation purposes, and came forward with
recommendations for dealing with them properly.2
Concurrently, because of the high degree of safetysensitivity in the aviation sector, it quickly became clear that
one of the major issues would be that of liability: who pays for
the damage in case an aircraft accident is ultimately caused by
wrongful or absent navigation information a t a critical point in
flight operations?
For example, efforts have been made a t least in writing to
establish liability for such damage on the basis of the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects (Liability C~nvention)~,
as constituting "damage caused by
[a] space o b j e ~ t "Others
.~
contended that air law would be the
more appropriate place to establish liability - if any - as resting
upon the providers of the relevant satellite signals, leading
some to further conclude that indeed no such direct liability existed in the first place.5
'

See e.g. in extenso BOAKYEDANQUAH KOFI HENAKU,THE LAWON GLOBAL
AIR
BY SATELLITE:
AN ANALYSIS OF LEGALASPECTSOF THE ICAO CNSIATM
NAVIGATION
(AST Law Monographs, Leiden 1998).
SYSTEM,
Later, the FANS-concept evolved into the more encompassing one of Communication, Navigation and SurveillancelAir Traffic Management (CNSIATM), and inter alia a
Legal Technical Expert Panel (LTEP) was established to make sure all relevant legal
aspects were considered. Also, efforts were made in the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) to accommodate the possible usage of GNSS.
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29,1972,24 U.S.T. 2389,961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
' Id. a t art. 11. See also Henaku, supra note I , a t 221.
"ee Michael Milde, Air Navigation and Safety: Institutional and Legal Problems
of the Global Navigation Satellite System, IV TEMASDE AVIACI6N COMERCIAL
Y
DERECHO
AERONAUTICO
Y ESPACIAL 134-5 (2000). It may be noted here, that under Art.
20(2) of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention], "negligent pilotage or negligence in the handling of the aircraft or in navigation", did relieve the carrier of liability. Whereas, under Art. X of the Protocol to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, Od. 28, 1955,478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol], this provision was not maintained.
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Currently, there are two global navigation systems in existence: the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPSI6 and the Russian GLONASS system7. The Russian constellation, for economic reasons, could not be replenished when consecutive satellites ended their operational life, therefore, the discussion on
liability for global navigation satellite systems in the context of
aviation has largely focused on GPS. In ICAO, for instance,
many member states have expressed their hesitation to accept
GPS as a structural component of air traffic services unless
there would be some sort of international liability established
for the provider(s) of system signals, specifically, the United
States, preferably in the form of an international treaty.'
With the advent of Galileo, the third global navigation system due to be operational by 2008 or shortly thereafterg, this
discussion entered into a new phase, for two reasons. Firstly,
the civil use of GPS in the context of safety-sensitive, highlyregulated and world-wide applications remains essentially confined to aviation. Other areas making substantive use of GPS
are either not internationally and heavily regulated, such as
maritime transport, or they concern non-professional areas such
as private car-driving or yachting. By contrast, Galileo from the
start was aimed a t providing services to a number of other
GPS is a 24-satellite constellation fully operational a s of 1994. The system, developed for military purposes and operated under the aegis of the Department of Defense,
in addition to a Precise Positioning Service (PPS) only available to the military, offers a
Standard Positioning Service (SPS) available to civil users such a s commercial aviation.
U.S. President Clinton in 1996 offered such use for a period of a t least ten years free of
charge by means of The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy National
Security Council, Fact Sheet U.S. Global Positioning System Policy, Mar. 29, 1996.
' GLONASS was launched as a 24-Satellite system quite similar to GPS by the
former Soviet Union, and became operational as of 1995. Equally developed by the military (space) forces, the GLONASS system is ultimately controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence, and emits both civil and military (encoded) signals. See Decree of the
Government of the Russian Federation, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 237. See generally, e.g., Patrick Salin, Regulatory Aspects of Future satellite Air Navigation Systems
174(FANS) on ICAO's 50thBirthday, 44 ZEITSCHRIFTFOR LUFT- UND WELTRAUMRECHT
175 (1995).
See, e.g., Francis P. Schubert, An International Convention on GNSS Liability:
When Does Desirable Become Necessary?, XXnT ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACELAW 245
(1999); See also Milde, supra note 5, a t 132.
' See e.g., Transport a n d Telecommunications, 2420th Council Mtg, Doc. 7282102
(Presse 78), 19-21 (Mar. 25-26, 2002); Council Regulation 876/2002/EC on setting up the
Galileo Joint Undertaking, 2002 O.J. (L 13811).
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transport applications such as high-speed trains or vessels as
well as non-transport applications like time synchronisation,
mobile phones, building, and banking. Secondly, in addition to
free signals roughly similar to the free GPS Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) signals, Galileo will provide a few categories
of signals namely services against payment for which it also will
have to accept a certain liability.''
OF LIABILITY
IN A GLOBAL
NAVIGATION
11. THE CONCEPT
SATELLITE
SYSTEM
CONTEXT

When analysing liability for system signals andlor services
that use those signals as crucial elements, on the one hand,
global navigation systems do not and will not start operating in
a legal or regulatory vacuum. On the other hand, most of existing law and regulation is non-global navigation satellite systemspecific. In many cases, the advent of global navigation satellite
systems on the scene merely adds another potential ultimate
cause of damage to those already in existence such as traditional navigation errors, human errors, engine failure or force
majeure, rather than leading to a fundamentally different, or
separate legal paradigm."
The legal environment within which GPS now and Galileo
will soon operate actually comprises a wide range of separate
and separately developed specific legal environments, none of
which were developed principally with global navigation satellite systems in mind. Yet all of them potentially or actually impact upon global navigation satellite systems and its applications. This includes liability. Most of these environments are
nationally defined. That is, they operate only within the territory of one particular state even if occasionally, as in air and
space law, international regimes are superimposed. At the same
ID
Cf: already GALILEO Mission Requirements Document Issue 5, E.C./ESA, Rev.
1.1 (Mar. 27, 2003); GALILEO Mission High Level Definition, E.C./ESA, Sept. 23, 2002;
or extensively the "Recommendations and Conclusions" arising from Task I, Legal and
Institutional Issues, of the GALILEI Study Cluster, DD-120, v. 2.1, July 24, 2003 [hereinaRer Recommendations and Conclusions]. See further infra section 6, focusing on this
issue.
"
Cf: also Milde, supra note 5, at 134.
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time, a global navigation satellite system is inherently global,
and both GPS and Galileo address global markets.
In view of such complexity, it is helpful to briefly consider
the concept of liability which is a term used in numerous national and international legal regimes.'* In each case, however,
it may be differently interpreted and applied with the consequence that, a t the international level, quite often a large
measure of conhsion has arisen as to the scope, meaning and
consequences in law of liability. Generally, "liability" is defined
as a "condition of being responsible for a possible or actual loss,
penalty, evil, expense or burden", and as "the state of being
bound or obliged in law or justice to do, pay, or make good something".13 In the context of Galileo, this definition has been elaborated as: "the accountability of a person or legal entity to compensate damage caused to another person or legal entity, in accordance with specified legal principles and rules and based
upon specified sources of law."14Thus, liability depends upon a
specific legal regime, which itself determines the boundaries of
the particular liability regime at issue regarding where it applies, which persons or legal entities are involved, what type of
liability is provided for, and how compensation is being dealt
with.
From the perspective of seeing which liability regimes do or
might apply to a GNSS and how they would apply, the fundamental threefold distinction between contractual liability, non-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Cf: eg., the authors Liability and Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception or
Misconstruction?, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH
COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAWOF

OUTERSPACE363-71 (1992).
l3
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY823 (5th ed. 1979); WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL
IN FIVELANGUAGES:
DEFINITIONS
OF THE LEGALAND COMMERCIAL
TERMS
DICTIONARY
AND PHRASES OF AMERICAN, ENGLISH AND CML LAW JURISDICTIONS
Val. 11, p. 47 (1983),
referring to, respectively, Union Oil Co. of California v. Basalt Rock Co., 30 Cal. App.2d
317, 319 - 20 (1939), and Fidelity Coal Co. v. Diamond, 310 Ill. App. 387 (1941) [hereinafter WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL
DICTIONARY].
"
Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, a t 101. See also, Cooperation
Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) - Galileo Between the
European Community and its Member States and the People's Republic of China, art.
2(i), Doc. Council of the EU 13324103 (Oct. 30, 2003) (defines liability as: "the legal accountability of a person or legal entity to compensate for damage caused to another
person or legal entity in accordance with specific legal principles and rules. This obligation may be prescribed in a n agreement (contractual liability) or in a legal norm (noncontractual liability).").
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contractual liability and product liability should also be noted.
The key issue distinguishing the three types of liability focuses
on the legal relationship between the claimant and the defendant.
"Contractual liability," for purposes of this paper, is defined
as "the liability which arises from a contract or agreement," and
thus fundamentally deals with liability as between parties to a
contract regarding activities undertaken in relation to damage
suffered in the context of the contract and its subject matter.15
Contractual liability is essentially a term coming from national
law, and, by way of common denominator is explicit, formalised
and already in existence at the time the relevant accident leading to damage occurs. Hence, for the purpose of analysis here, it
coincides in a principled sense with inter-party liability as it is
often discussed on the public international level, where international treaties between states would essentially take the place of
contracts. From a legal point of view, dealing with contractual
liability is a matter of the freedom of parties to contract between
themselves. This freedom may only be restricted by overriding
public interests in contracts being generally fair, if indeed such
public interests are expressed through law or other legally binding documents.
In view of the above definition of "contractual liability" noncontractual liability would then be liability for damage occurring outside a contractual relationship. This occurs where the
person or entity suffering the damage is not formally or contractually related to the person or entity causing it, and is likely
unaware of the possibility of damage occurring nor is able to
take precautionary measures against it.16 Thus, it equates at
this level of abstraction with the tort liability17of national legal
l5

BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 13, at 295, and WEST'SLAW & COMMERCIAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at Vol. I, p. 339, which define "contractual obligationn as
"the obligation which arises from a contract or agreement." See also Recommendations
and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 102.
'' Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 102.
l7
"Tortnis defined as, "a private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damagesn.
supra note 13, at 1334; WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL
BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY,
DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at Vol. 11, p. 660.
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systems, respectively the third-party liability known in international law. Its common denominator would thus be that the legal relationship is implicit, not formalised and solely based on
the fact that one party is the proven cause of the damage sustained by the other party.
As a consequence, protecting the interests of third parties
through non-contractual liability regimes is a public matter, to
be taken care of preferably by legislative means, since by definition entities cannot protect their interests by contract or otherwise. Hence, this is also the type of liability which a public legislative document on the international level is most often concerned with, although exceptions exist, such as most notably the
Warsaw system on contractual liability in international air
transport." On the national level, this equates with the need
for, preferably, a clear written law or statute, or in common law
countries at least clear jurisprudence and customary law.
"Product liability" is defined as, "the legal liability of manufacturers and sellers to compensate buyers, users, and even bystanders, for damages or injuries suffered because of defects in
Thus, as also dealt with in the context of
goods purcha~ed".'~
G ~ l i l e oit, ~is~ of a different nature; not imposing liability upon
someone for activities undertaken and damage suffered as a
consequence, but imposing it upon someone having manufactured andlor sold a product by which, in the course of using it,
damage has been caused. In a sense this constitutes an indirect
form of liability, as the occurrence which triggers liability claims
may take place long after the manufacturer or seller - the entity
to be held liable - has had any involvement with the product.
The relevant legal relationship here is effectively created
through the product concerned. Also, product liability, even if
elements may have found their way into contracts for the sale of
the product in the last resort is a matter of general public interests being preserved through the enunciation of explicit law.

See further supra note 5, infra note 48, and accompanying text.
supra note 13, at 1089, and WEST'S LAW &
BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY,
COMMERCIAL
DICTIONARY,
supra note 13, at Vol. 11, p. 358.
m
See also Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 102.
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111. GPS AND THE LEGATJFUNCTIONAL
MODEL
This section applies liability to the context of global navigation systems, particularly GPS as it is the first fully operational
version.
To properly apply current liability concepts to GPS it is
helpful to refer to the LegaVFunctional Model (Model) for a
global navigation satellite system and its activities which was
developed for the European Cornmi~sion.~~
It is based upon the
fundamental categories of players and their ensuing legal relationships. In view of the definition of liability provided above,
this Model should help in answering the salient overarching but rather broad - question on liability issues in the context of
GPS. That is, which legal entities would be held liable to compensate for damage caused to another legal entity in the context
of GPS activities?
As a generic concept based upon the existence of the currently operational systems, GPS and GLONASS, the Model presumes three essential categories of satellite navigation functions are discernable. They are:
1. basic or primary signal provision: which could hardly be
labelled a "service provision" since existing basically of the
provision only of signals-in-space carrying basic data;
2. augmented or secondary signal pro~ision,'~
which sometimes could be, and is, labelled "service provision", since
more than just the signal-in-space carrying basic data is
provided; and

3. value-added service provision.

This threefold categorisation of activities leads to a fourfold
functional categorisation of key actors in the context of a global
navigation satellite system with three fundamental categories of
legal relationships involved. (Figure 1, Appendix
Figure 1
Id.
See e.g., Schubert, supra note 8, at 250-1; Henaku, supra note 1, at 171.
23
See e.g., Schubert, supra note 8, at 251-2; Henaku, supra note 1, at 172.
Figure 1 is a reproduction inter alia of Figure 2, "The Functional Model of GNSS
Signal and Service Provision", as contained in "Regulatory Issues* arising from Task I,
I'
22
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(Appendix 1) summarises the current situation with regard to
GPS and GLONASS. GPS (and GLONASS) is a basic signal
provider, with its SPS falling within the category of A. No barrier to access is in place, making it a clear open access-type signal available to three categories of players: the end-users, the
value-added service providers and the augmentation providers.
This, essentially a t their own initiative: anyone with the right
type of receiver can receive the signal without any service fee
being required. (The GPS precise positional services (PPS) are
not included in this Model, since they are encoded and made
available only to a very limited group of users - basically the
U.S. military and NATO allies.)
The major issue in particular for aviation in view of relevant ICAO requirements is that the SPS, in addition to the absence of high-level accuracy and continuity, lacks the level of
integrity monitoring25 necessary for serving as a stand-alone
system for approach, landing and take-off operations of aircraft.
As .to the augmentation providers, A is currently being
picked up by three such satellite-based wide-area augmentation
systems in experimental fashion: the European Geostationary
Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS)26for Europe, the Wide
Area Augmentation System (WAAS)27for the United States, and
the Multi-Functional Transport Satellite-Based Augmentation
System (MSAS)" for Japan and the surrounding region." These
Legal and Institutional Zssws, of the GALILEI Study Cluster, DD-123,v. 1.1, 16 July
2002, 24. Whilst this document is only publicly available in v. 2.0,of 5 December 2002,
where it has not been included, this Figure lies a t the root of all relevant Figures also of
Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10,a t 102.
25
"Integrity" refers to the trust a user can place in the correctness of the signals,
and to his being warned if the signals are no longer within the bounds of such correctness as indicated by certain parameters.
28
EGNOS stands for European Geo-stationary Navigation Overlay System, and is
currently developed by the European Tripartite Group consisting of European Union as
represented by the European Commission, the European Space Agency (ESA) and Eurocontrol, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. See e.g., Henaku,
supra note 1,a t 175-6.
* WAAS stands for Wide Area Augmentation System, and is currently developed by
the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). See e.g., Henaku, supra note 1,a t 1745.
" MSAS stands for Multi-functional transport Satellite-based Augmentation System, and is currently developed by the Japanese government. See e.g., Henaku, supra
note 1 a t 176.
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systems make up for the lack of accuracy and integrity inherent
in A that precludes any safety-sensitive usage, by augmenting A
into becoming B: signals which do comply with the high levels
required for aviation in most or even all phases of flight.30
In cases of safety-sensitive usage, value-added service providers would likely be forced by the governmental authorities
under national or even international regulation to use B (instead of A); outside such situations, the use of B may be equally
a t the value-added service provider's, alternatively end-user's
own initiative. Of course, aviation would be the clearest example of regulation-induced or -required usage of B.
Whilst indeed the augmentation providers mentioned in
terms of operational requirements are very much focusing on
aviation, as the most directly interested transport sector, already a t present this does not preclude other users - such as for
purposes of precision farming - from using EGNOS or WAAS
signals. Certainly in principle, nothing prevents augmented
signals, even if developed purely for aviation requirements from
being of interest to other sectors, a t least until access would become closed or controlled.
Finally, value-added service providers may use either A or
B, depending upon their need and the costs involved, to incorporate them into value-added services C, such as navigation information, in general, perhaps on a commercial basis but certainly in the case of aviation essentially on a regulatory basis.
Currently, to the extent that authorities are considering allowing or even requiring users to use system signals, that is,
mainly within aviation, these will be incorporated into C as Air
Traffic Services (ATS) and Air Traffic Control (ATC) services, in
addition to being directly received and used by aircraft operators. In view of the large measure of orientation on aviation in
current global navigation satellite system augmentation, a t pre29

There are a few non satellite based augmentation systems that will not be discussed. However, examples include LORAN-C (Long-Range Navigation system) and DGPS (Differential GPS).
" As discussed in particular in the context of ICAO, the ultimate ideal would be for
GNSS to constitute "sole meansn of navigation for all phases of flights, since it is then
that in terms of necessary infrastructure and avionics the economic advantages of having a single global coherent and interoperable system become fully available.
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sent, the aviation sector is the only sector where such valueadded service providers already play an important role. Elsewhere, comprehensive, general and widespread provision of C is
hardly a t issue so far. It is for that reason also that air law enters into the equation, including the air law liability regimes.
Because of the current focus of global navigation satellite systems on aviation, the effect of air law liability has a major impact "upstream" on the signal and service provision by both basic signal and augmentation providers. At the same time, this
changes to the extent that system signals and services, either
now or in the future, would be used in other sectors - in principle, however, in accordance with the same generic Model for
global navigation satellite systems.

IV. GPS AND LIABILITY
The GNSS LegaWunctional Model (Figure 1, Appendix 1)
already indicates the major issues for GPS as far as liability is
concerned The arrows marked A, B and C, whilst representing
categories of signals and services, now translate into the relevant legal relationships in terms of liability. In the case of A,
such liability is unlikely to be qualified as contractual liability
as previously defined since open access to those signals and the
impossibility for the provider to monitor who receives and uses
it would negate the existence of a contract. The term "contract"
is used here in the widest possible sense: a bilateral agreement,
in principle in writing, freely concluded between two parties
containing mutual rights and obligation^.^^ Thus, an agreement
between two states or one state and a foreign private entity
would also qualify as a "contract" under this definition, even if
the public nature of one of the parties might cause important
additional legal problems to arise. In spite of some arguments
31

"Contract"is defined as, "an agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing", of which the "essentials are
competent parties, subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and
mutuality of obligation". BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 291-92, and
W ~ s r LAW
s
& COMMERCIAL
DICTIONARY,
supra note 13, at Vol. I, p. 338. Whereas,
"contract"can also refer to "the writing which contains the agreement of parties, with
the terms and conditions, and which serves as a proof of the obligation".Id.
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that try to establish a "virtual" contract between the primary
signal provider and all others,32most experts agree that the provision of these signals would not give rise to contractual liabil-

it^.^^

In the case of GPS, U.S. authorities have disclaimed the existence of anything similar to a "contract" or bilateral or multilateral international agreement, against efforts to construe a
contractual relationship and hence any contractual-type of liability.34However, they do not deny in principle the possibility
for liability claims under U.S. tort law.
In the case of B and C, there can be far less doubt that the
provision of such signals and services even in the current case of
GPS, would be a matter of contract. The successful efforts to
involve the respective aviation authorities in developing WAAS
and EGNOS would amount to a contract even if proper, formal
contracts would not be signed.
At the same time, in terms of liability one should realise
that, as concluded before,35 contractual liability principally
should be seen to refer to liability in case of damage caused by
the one party to the contract to the other. All then depends upon
the definition of "damage" in the legal liability regime applied to
it. Does it include indirect damage? If not, contractual liability
could only refer to the damage caused to the contract partner's
receiver, not to the damage, such as an aircraft crashing, resulting from incorrect information delivered to the receiver, or from
information not sent to the receiver.
If the focus is on the aviation sector as the major target for
augmentation by EGNOS, WAAS and MSAS, the issue of contractual liability in view of the existing air law liability regimes
is raised and a fourth relevant category of legal relationships,
clearly "contractual" in nature, also arises. In Figure 1 (Appendix I),the end-users effectively represent the aircraft operators.
The consumers, the passengers or consignors of cargo, arise as a
separate category of "actors". They find themselves in a contrac32

"
"
35

See e.g., Henaku, supra note 1, at 183-85.
See Milde, supra note 5, at 134-35.
Id. at 133-35.
See supra, Section 2 , on the definition of contractual liability.
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tual relationship with the airlines, a relationship represented by
an arrow D in Figure 2 (Appendix 2). This is an important aspect which in turn relates to liability as will be seen.
For non-contractual liability, as previously defined in terms
of the structure surnmarised by Figure 1 (Appendix I), this results in the following picture. The essence of non-contractual,
third-party liability, it may be reasserted, would be that outsiders to a specific activity suffer damage as a consequence of an
activity. For such reasons, regardless of the existence of GNSS,
relevant non-contractual tort and third-party liability regimes
not specifically focused on GNSS would nevertheless apply.
In terms of "actors" in the area of GNSS, as the building
blocks for the Legal/Functional Model of Figure 1 (Appendix I),
such "outsiders" could therefore be easily lumped together in
one category, as third-party victims. All possible noncontractual liability relationships of such third-party victims
with all of the true "actors" of Figure 1 (Appendix I), including
the consumers added above, can then be represented by various
arrows E.
It depends on any applicable third-party liability regime,
national or international, whether such third parties suffering
damage could assert a claim not only to the entity or person
causing the damage directly, for example, the aircraft operator,
but also to the system signal provider having delivered wrongful
navigation information to that entity ultimately at the root of
the accident.
In the case of GPS, U.S. national third-party liability, that
is, t o r t law would be considered. Here, the concept of sovereign
immunity is key to successfully assert a claim for noncontractual liability. Absent specific provisions to the contrary,
this concept means that any claim for public liability against the
U.S. government would be inadmissible. The rule would be that
the U.S. government may not be sued for public liability.36
36

"Sovereign immunity" is defined as "preclud[ing] litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless sovereign consents to suit". BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at
DICTIONARY,
supra note 13, at Vol. 11, p. 552,
1252, and WEST'SLAW & COMMERCIAL
referring to Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans,
333 F. Supp. 353,355 (1971).
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By way of exceptions to the rule, precise regulations then
exist which provide for circumstances where the sovereign immunity of the U.S. government is or might be waived. he relevant U.S. regulations for the present
would be the Federal Tort Claims
the Suits in Admiralty
the Foreign
Claims Act3' and the Military Claims Act." Generally speaking,
it is rather uncertain that either of these acts could be used for
the successful assertion of claims regarding GPS failures and
consequent damages. As a result, claims for U.S. public liability
for GPS might easily fail.41 For example, the Federal Tort
Claims Act does not apply in case of "any claim arising in a foreign
Or, the Suits in Admiralty Act applies only if
"the accident (1) arose on the high seas or navigable waters of
the United States; (2) posed a potential threat to maritime
commerce; and (3) was substantially related to traditional maritime a~tivity."~
Moreover, in view of the global application of GPS, the
problem of non-U.S. citizens claiming for compensation in U.S.
courts would remain. From a practical and political point of
view, such claims would require the claimant to travel to the
United States, introduce his claim in English to U.S. courts,
possibly hire a U.S. lawyer, and suchlike. There would be no
fundamental legal impediment for non-U.S. citizens to do so, but
in practice it might turn out to be rather difficult to assert one's
claims. Furthermore, a claim before a U.S. court against
the
U.S. government for damage resulting from the usage of signals
provided for free is not a very promising venue in terms of possible success.
It is doubtable, finally, whether other governments which
would ultimately be held responsible for the safety of aviation in
-

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC 58 1346(b),2671-2680 (1988).
Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 USC Appx. $8 741-752 (1988).
39
Foreign Claims Act, 10 USC 8 2734 (1994).
40
Military Claims Act, 10 USC 8 2733 (1994).
41
See Jonathan M. Epstein, Global Positioning System (GPS): Defining the Legal
Issues of its Expanding Civil Use, 61 J . AIR L. & COM.243,262-68 (1995).
"' Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 37, 82680(k).See also Epstein, supra note 42,
265.
43
Under the so-called "Sisson testn, Sisson v. Ruby 497 U.S. 358 (1990), as dealt
with by Epstein, supra note 42, 266.
37

38
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their own airspace44would agree to sue in a private capacity
within the U.S. legal system. This was the main reason states in
ICAO proposed that a relevant treaty on GNSS liability should
be drafted." Additionally, if the damage occurs in a jurisdiction
other than that of the United States, it might be possible to assert a claim against the GPS providers in those jurisdictions. In
practice however, the option for the United States not to waive
its sovereign immunity would make any such possibility a theoretical one.
Finally, as to product liability, the manufacturers and sellers could be brought into Figure 1(Appendix 1)as another category of relevant actors within the GNSS Model. The potential
liability relationships are represented by arrows F in Figure 2
(Appendix 2). This is the result of applying the relevant categories of liability onto the Figure 1 (Appendix 1)Model. These relationships are with all the actors referred to before, including
the third-party victims even though in practice this would likely
be dealt with by law which is not GNSS-specific (see in particular arrow F-6). Since the manufacture or sale of relevant products is not the business of the GPS operators, further analyses
are beyond the scope of this paper. In sum, as to the issue of
liability for the first generation global navigation systems, Figure 2 (Appendix 2) represents the situation as applicable to GPS
as a basic signal provider and for its augmentation provider.46
Using the aviation sector as an example for illustrating the
relevant liability issues, it is noted that the value-added service
providers would be mainly ATS and ATC providers, the enduser would consist of the airlines and the consumers would be
the passengers and consignors of cargo.

" See

Convention On International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 28, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 UNTS 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. See also Schubert, supra note 8,
at 252-54.
'' See e.g., Schubert, supra note 8, at 258-61.
" Figure 2 is a reproduction of Figure 4 located in, The GNSS-1 Functional Model
and Liability Issues (GPS, GLONASS), [2002] WP I.4.B, GALILEO System Liability Part I - Interoperability, v.2, of the GALILEI Study Cluster. Whilst this document is not
publicly available, this Figure is an adaptation of Figure 1 to the liability scenario, and
as such underlying also Figure 5, infia.
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Since A does not encompass contractual liability, both foreign ATC-providers and foreign airlines could only claim for
anything other than contractual liability for GPS-related darnages. This leads to the crucial question of how compensable
damage is to be defined: events likely to cause damage of a
really major dimension as a consequence of erroneous or absent
navigation information by GNSS do not concern the direct damage caused by emission of the signals as such, but, for example,
the crash of an aircraft. The conclusion should be that such latter cases of liability would normally be dealt with by either contractual liability as far as the passengers or consignors of cargo
are concerned, or third-party liability relative t o innocent victims on the ground. In air law, the first refers to the 1929 Warsaw Convention" and subsequent contractual liability conventions up to the 1999 Montreal Convention4' - which are subsumed under D. The second refers to the 1952 Rome Convention
on third-party liability,49or for the many states where this Convention is not in force, national tort law, which is subsumed under E-4.
47

4a

See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5.

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air,
May 28, 1999, ICAO Doc. 9740 (entered into force Nov. 4 2003) [hereinafter Montreal
Convention]. The other international instruments to be referred to encompass such
agreements as the Hague Protocol, supra note 5; the Convention, Supplementary to the
Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person other than the Contracting C a m e r , Sept. 18, 1961,
500 U.N.T.S. 31, ICAO Doc. 8181 (entered into force May 1, 1964) [hereinafter Guadalajara Convention]; the Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, May 4, 1966, Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No.
18,900, approved by Exec. Order No. 23,680,31 Fed. Reg. 7302; Additional Protocol No. 1
to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Camage by Air, Signed a t Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Sept. 25, 1975, U.K.T.S. 1997
No. 75, ICAO Doc. 9145 (entered into force Feb. 15, 1996); Additional Protocol No. 2 to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Signed a t Warsaw on 12 October 1929 a s Amended by the Protocol done
a t The Hague on 28 September 1955, September 25, 1975, U.KT.S. 1997 No. 76, ICAO
Doc. 9146 (entered into force Feb. 15, 1996); and Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the
convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Signed a t Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol done a t The
Hague on 28 September 1955, September 25, 1975, U.K.T.S. 1999 No. 28, ICAO Doc.
into force June 1 4 1998).
-9148'' (entered
conventionem Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, October 7, -1952,310 U.N.T.S. 181;ICAO Doc. 7364 (entered into force Feb. 4 1958)
[hereinafter Rome Convention].
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It follows that both these regimes would apply in principle
regardless of whether navigation errors were the cause of the
accident, or more "traditional" events - human errors, thunderstorms, engine failures or sabotage, if not specifically falling
under clauses excepting terrorism-related accidents. Both of
them point to the airlines as the liable entities. So the first
question under non-contractual liability is to what extent claimants might want to circumvent these regimes, and then, as
third-party claimants from the perspective of navigation service
providers, claim directly against the basic signal or augmentation providers. The extent to which the applicable third-party
liability regimes, in this case the U.S. tort system, would allow
them to do so is then the next, more important question. Other
states do not feel comfortable with this option, hence their desire to solidify possibilities for claims by an international convention on GNSS liability for the aviation sector. However, the
United States is not particularly interested in such an option,
which may likely cause this approach to be impractical for the
time being.50As a consequence, Eurocontrol has developed the
concept of the contractual liability chain. Contracts are to spell
out the extent of liability accepted between the parties, including to what extent derogation to the other party of "ulterior"
liabilities under the contract might be ~ a r r a n t e d . ~ '

V. GALILEOAND THE LEGALD'UNCTIONAL
MODEL
The complexity of Galileo as compared to the current situation becomes apparent upon adapting the Model for GPS, that is
for generic systems of the first generation to the case of Galileo,
which is effectively a second-generation system. Firstly, GPS is
operated and controlled by a single-state entity, the U.S. Department of Defense, even if civil users are involved through
consultation boards and other mechanisms, whereas Galileo is
envisaged to be operated by a private operator, provisionally
See Schubert, supra note 8, at 261; Milde, supra note 5, at 132 .
See e.g., Setting up the Contractual Framework, Eurocontrol GNSS LTF,
C/SF/p010506/17.05.01; Skyguide memo to Eurocontrol GNSS LTF of 5 March 2003;
Refocusing the work of the EUROCONTROL GNSS Legal Task Force, Skyguide Memo,
C/SF/October 6,2003. See also Schubert, supra note 8, at 261.
61
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called the Galileo Operating Company ( C ~ m p a n y )It. ~is
~ to be
supervised by a public entity provisionally called the Galileo
Supervisory Authority (Authority) representing the European
Union, the European Space Agency (ESA) and their member
states.53Together they comprise the Galileo Core Structure.
The main reasons for involving a private operator as a key
entity in the organisational structure for a system with obvious
fundamental public aspects were?
flexible, non-bureaucratic and commercial modes of operation;
marketing purposes;
obtaining finances and investments from the capital markets in normal commercial modes;
dealing with intellectual property rights in a proper and
more commercially-oriented fashion;
obtaining insurance against limited liability;55
making a sensible business partner; and
the far better capabilities of, and opportunities available to,
a private entity to develop new services and markets in a
commercially assertive manner.

Conversely, the reasons for involving a public oversight
body as a key entity in the organisational structure for a system
where private and commercial modes of operation have been
deemed to be most beneficial were?

52

It may be noted that the process of tendering the concession began October 2003,
the aim being that by the end of 2004 a winning concessionaire will be selected to fulfil
that role of the "Galileo Operating Company".
* See also the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of structures
for the management of the European satellite radionavigation programme, COM(03)471
final at 4 & art. 19 hereinafter Management Structures Proposal].
54
See e.g., Recommendations-and Conclusions, supra note 10, a t 33.
53

It may be noted that insurance against unlimited liability is either outright impossible to obtain, or likely to be impossibly expensive. See also infra note 59.
56
See e.g., Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 33-34.
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negotiating and concluding agreements with states "external" to Galileo yet hosting Galileo-related assets and service
providers;67
licensing non-European augmentation and integrity providers, or negotiating and concluding agreements on such operations by the private operator;
serving the general public interests, for example in regard
of safety, security and search-and-rescue issues;58
possibly offering unlimited liability in the last resort to
value-added service providers and end-users;59
enhancing the trust by the public at large in the system
with respect to such issues as certification and safety licenses;

67

The Management Structures Proposal provides that,
'The Supervisory Authority shall be open to the participation of countries
which are not members of the European Union and which have concluded
agreements with the European Union to this effect. Under the relevant provisions of these agreements, arrangements shall be worked out specifymg, in
particular, the nature, scope and procedural aspects of the involvement of
these countries in the work of the Supervisory Authority, including provisions
relating to financial contributions and staff."
Management Structures Proposal, supra note 53,a t art. 19.
Id. art. 1 (the Galileo Supervisory Authority should "manage the public interests
relating to the European satellite radionavigation programme"), also id. arts. 20-22
(setting up a Centre for Security and Safety).
59
In order to enhance the attractiveness of Galileo to the maximum, offering acceptance of unlimited liability (where appropriate) would be necessary; this however would
somehow have to rest upon the shoulders of the public entities concerned, namely the
GSA and the member states behind it. See also supra note 56. Clearly, this has not been
decided yet. Article 17 of the Management Structures Proposal only mentions:
"1. Contractual liability on the part of the Supervisory Authority shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract in question.. ."
2. In the event of non-contractual liability, the Supervisory Authority shall
take steps, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of
the Member states, to remedy any damage caused by its departments or by its
staff in the performance of their duties ..."
Management Structures Proposal, supra note 53,a t art. 17.
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for purposes of negotiating where necessary access for the
private operator to the markets of states not belonging to
the Galileo core group of states; and
liaising with other relevant organisations such as ICAO.

Secondly, Galileo aims to provide at least five different sets
of services as opposed to GPS which, apart from an open SPS
signal, only emits a closed access PPS signal. Technically speaking, a number of various signals-in-space will be emitted by the
Galileo satellites which, through being combined in various
ways and further differentiated by means of additional characteristics, result in the four main Galileo services being delivered
to value-added service providers and end-users. They are the
open service, the commercial services, the safety-of-life services
and the public-regulated ser~ices.~'
In addition, a contribution to
existing search-and-rescue services (SAR) as currently provided
by the COSPAS-SARSAT system is intended.61
The open service will be provided for free and will be similar to the GPS SPS, albeit perhaps slightly enhanced in respect
of accuracy and continuity. Most importantly therefore, from a
legal and regulatory perspective the characteristics of this service would again lead to the principled absence of a contractual
situation between the Company and the value-added service
provider or end-user. Hence, it is referred to as A for the purpose of the Model.
The open service would be provided directly by the Galileo
system to both value-added services providers and end-users.
This is where a number of individualised mass-market applications are envisaged to arise. Any user with a technically compatible receiver will be able to receive and use the signal for his
or her own purposes, and he or she would require no more than
such a receiver to benefit from the signals.
From a legal and regulatory perspective, the commercial
services, the safety-of-life services and the public regulated services, can be taken together as B in the Model because of the
See GALILEO Mission Requirements Document, supra note 10, at 19-22.
Id. a t 24.
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presence of a contract in some form with the Company. Whatever characteristics would then be added per service, or per type
of contract, some form of contractual relationship will arise.
This allows for considerable opportunities for the Company to
determine the legal relationship with value-added service providers and end-users, including liability.
Perhaps the signals involved still would call for a user to
have a compatible receiver, were it not devices would be used to
control access to them. In the latter case however, which is the
current scenario, both a compatible receiver and the encryption
or authentication key would be necessary before the signals can
be used in an authenticated fashion. Consequently a contract for
subscription, or other legal instrument setting forth rights and
obligations of the two parties between each other, will be required. These aspects would apply to all three variants of B.
There are, of course, elements which separate those variants. The commercial services would specifically focus on providing higher accuracy by added data, higher continuity and
higher availability with the support from local elements where
required. A proper service guarantee would come to spell out the
obligation of the Company to provide services up to certain
standards of accuracy, continuity and availability. These services would be renumerated directly through a user fee, by any
value-added service provider, or other user, interested in the
higher accuracy, continuity and availability as well as the service guarantee likely to be provided. Applications would arise in
such higher-end mass-market areas as location-based services,
integrated telecom-and-information services and those traffic
control systems which are commercially- but not safety- or security-sensitive, like road tolling.
The safety-of-life services first focused on aviation. With the
potential to be extended to other safety-sensitive transportation,
high-speed vessels, high-speed trains, for example, these services will have as their outstanding feature integrity monitoring
up to the level required by aviation for taxiing, take-off and
landing addressed by the Chicago Convention and its Annexes,
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containing the relevant SARPS.~'Where the world-wide integrity to be provided by the Company is not acceptable or not accepted, such integrity monitoring may also be provided by regional elements outside of the Galileo Core System (GCS). In
this respect the legal situation will be correspondingly complicated because of an additional, non-Galileo and presumably
non-European entity being involved next to the Company. Furthermore, local elements might be involved in locally providing
the necessary higher performance in terms of accuracy, availability and continuity. Payment would be through the general
user fees for navigation services of which Galileo would only
form one element. The payment would be paid by the users to
the value-added service providers which in turn would pay the
Company for the Galileo-input it provided.63
Currently, safety and security-sensitive sectors such as
aviation, and maritime transport, are involved in the usage of
such services, whether GNSS-based or not. They would provide
the relevant markets for these types of Galileo signals.
The public-regulated services will aim a t governmental and
other public services such as police, fire-brigades, emergency,
perhaps crucial infrastructures for energy, water and communications. Their outstanding feature will be a high level of technical security against interference, jamming, spoofing and unauthorised usage. This will be guaranteed through technical robustness and encryption. Payment for those services would
likely occur through availability payments or other lump-sum
arrangements, by the relevant governmental department or
service. The SAR service falls outside of the construct of the
Model. Essentially the signal provider, the Galileo core entities,
will pay for signal provision, to be refunded through the participating states.
In principle, the Galileo Model could be developed for each
of the four core services, in order to achieve a precise overview
of the relevant issues. This, however, would obviously go beyond
the scope of the current article, and it suffices here to "stack"
62
63

See supra note 2.
See Recommendations and Conclusions,supra note 10, at 122,175.
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the four Models which would otherwise arise onto each other so
as to form one "generic* Galileo Model.
Further, these four types of core services will, generally
speaking, be offered to non-Galileo entities, which are for the
overwhelming part essentially interested in offering or consuming a service of which the relevant Galileo service forms only
one element. From a wider perspective therefore, the area of
Galileo-relevant services is currently envisaged to encompass
basically three categories of services:
Galileo-only services (open service, commercial services,
safety-of-life services, public-regulated services), to be provided by the GCS, that is, in terms of architecture the satellites in space and the necessary ground infrastructure, alternatively by the GCS in conjunction with regional elements providing regional integrity.
Galileo local services for example, airport approach systems, to be provided by local elements in combination with
the GCS, plus - optionally - regional elements.
Galileo combined services such as mapping and database,
or telecom services, to be provided by other systems,
whether global, regional or local, together with any combination of the GCS, regional elements and local elements.

This last category is where C comes in: a theoretically wide
range of value-added services incorporating Galileo timing, positioning and navigation i n f ~ r m a t i o n Provision
.~~
of value-added
services by the Company itself currently is not foreseen. All the
above considerations led to the Model for Galileo as represented
by Figure 3 (Appendix 3).65
A word of caution is due here, however. With the process of
tendering and finally negotiating for the Galileo concession to be
awarded by the end of 2004 just having gotten under way, this
a

In the context of the Galileo Architecture Definition (GALA) Study performed for
the European Commission, 100 different applications were discerned as presenting
potentially interesting markets for Galileo services; see in particular GALA, Synthesis
on Service Definition, Gala-ASPI-TNO11, a t 39-44, (Oct. 10 2001).
65
Figure 3 is a slightly adapted reproduction of Figure 2 of Recommendations and
Conclusions. See Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, a t 79.

152

JOURNAL O F SPACE LAW

[VOL.30

Model is reflecting the current presumptions on what the GaliLeo structure will look like by 2008, the year of envisaged full
operational capability of the Galileo system. In the end, that
structure may turn out to look different in some areas. These
could include the precise outline of the relevant services, the
role the Company is going to play in that respect, as well as the
respective roles, rights and obligations of the Company and the
Authority between them. At the same time, this largely concerns the internal division of tasks, competencies, responsibilities and liabilities within the GCS. It would not fundamentally
change the equation as far as the legal role of the GCS relative
to other actors is concerned.

VI. GALILEO
AND LIABILITY
Similarly to the generic GNSS Model as applied to GPS, the
liability issues can be charted upon the specific case of Galileo
(Figure 4, Appendix 4). Again, the arrows in Figure 3 (Appendix 3) that represent the respective general legal relationships
following from the provision of certain signals or services are
now translated effectively into liability-relationships; the direction of the arrows pointing to which entity liability might be
owed by the entity at the sending end of the arrow.
The regional elements as well as local elements have been
left out. As to the regional elements, special contracts namely,
in the form of international agreements of a specific nature
might be entertained, in which case liability issues might be
included in the contracts. If no such contracts would be envisaged, as the GCS would tend to view the role of such regional
elements as autonomous, almost as the GPS authorities look
upon EGNOS and MSAS, the liability which might apply here
would be of a non-contractual nature.
A similar situation would pertain to local elements enhancing the Galileo signals and services without providing valueadded services. Unlike the regional elements, local elements
might have to be contracted by the Company if the Company
sees a need for their involvement. In a sense, the liability issues
here might work the other way around: when paying for local
enhancement to better sell its services, the Company might look
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for protection against liability for damage as a result of the local
element-input, rather than being required to offer protection to
such local elements in terms of liability. This might also be determined to a considerable extent by contractual negotiations on
many levels and among many entities.
Galileo SAR services were not included in Figure 3 (Appendix 3) and are not in Figure 4 (Appendix 4). Thus, the chart in
Figure 4 (Appendix 4) emerges.66
Figure 4 (Appendix 4) represents a generic liability chart
for Galileo. Just as the U.S. authorities would likely deny any
liability other than of a non-contractual nature for the GPS
SPS, Galileo would not accept any contractual liability for the
open service A, since A is not contracted for. Similarly to GPS,
Galileo would also refuse to accept such contractual liability in
jurisdictions other than those of the European states constituting the A ~ t h o r i t ~even
, ~ ' if the Company may not be able to invoke sovereign immunity in those cases, so that it ultimately
depends upon non-Galileo jurisdictions whether liability, alternatively a refusal thereof, might nevertheless be acknowledged.
Regarding Figure 4 (Appendix 4), it is important to realise
that the major liability issues regarding Galileo arise outside
the core categories of actors involved in the contractual relationships and therefore are outside the Galileo legal framework. In
the context of activities covered by the contractual relationships
under A, B and even C, the possibilities for causing damage directly, in and of itself, by such activities are likely to result in
damage of a rather limited nature. It is under D, that the darnages start to be major, leading to key contractual liability issues.

" Figure 4 is a slightly adapted reproduction of Figure 17 of Recommendations and
Conclusions. See Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10,a t 105.
67
I t should be noted that recently, the People's Fkpublic of China and the European
Commission, acting on behalf of the Galileo Joint Undertaking and hence indirectly also
on behalf of ESA, have come to a mutual understanding that the former would invest a n
amount in the range of 200 million € in Galileo. The details of this understanding, for
example a s to what the investment will exactly comprise and to what extent the People's
Republic of China would become "integrated* in the institutional structure still have to
be negotiated, but may for example result in a sort of associated membership of the
GSA.
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The classical example would be that of an aircraft causing
damage to its passengers in the course of the flight for which
those passengers contracted, whether ultimately caused by
wrong or absent GNSS-derived input, whether A, B or C, or by
more traditional human or technical failures. These damages
form the subject-matter of a well-elaborated regime of air law.68
In case of system signals used in other transport sectors,
relevant sector-specific regimes would apply in similar fashion.
Thus, for maritime transport, available treaties include the
Athens Convention of 197469;for rail transport, the Convention
concerning the International Transport by Rail,'' together with the
Convention concerning the Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by
Rail," and the Convention concerning the Carriage of Goods by
RailI2 and its 1990 Protoc01'~on cargo; and for road transport, the
Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by RoadI4on passenger Liability. "
Major or catastrophic damage could also arise under certain
categories of the non-contractual liabilities E, along the lines of
the above, especially E-4, mirroring D. It is unlikely that the
BB

See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, and supra note 48.
Athens Convention Relating to the carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by
TRANSPORT
Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, U.K.T.S. 1987 No. 40, 14 I.L.M. 945, INTERNATIONAL
1-229 (Supp. 1-10 1986) (entered into force Apr. 28, 1987).
TREATIES,
Convention concerning the International Transport by Rail, May 9, 1980,
INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORT
TREATIES,
V-183 (Supp. 1-10 1986), entered into force May
1,1985 hereinafter COTIF Convention].
"
Convention concerning the Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Rail, Feb. 7,
TRANSPORT
TREATIES,
V-133 (Supp. 1-10 1986) (entered into force
1970, INTERNATIONAL
Jan. 1, 1975, effectively incorporated and superseded by the COTIF Convention of May
1,1985, supra note 70).
72
Convention concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail, Feb. 7, 1970,
INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORT
TREATIES,
V-58 (Supp. 1-10 1986) (entered into force Jan. 1,
1975, effectively incorporated and superseded by the COTIF Convention of May 1,1985,
supra note 70).
l3
Protocol of 1990 to Amend the International Convention concerning the International Transport by Rail (COTIF) of 9 May 1980, Dec. 20, 1990, INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORT
TREATIES,V-300 (Supp. 15 1991) (entry into force Nov. 1,1996).
"
Convention on the Contract for the International Camage of Passengers and
TREATIES,IV-43
Luggage by Road (CVR), Mar. 1, 1973, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT
(Supp. 1-10 1986) (entered into force Apr. 12, 1994).
l5
See Frans G. von der Dunk, The European Equation: GNSS = Multimodality +
Liability, in AIR AND SPACELAWIN THE 21" CENTURY
240-245 (Marietta Benko & Walter
K.011eds., 2001) hereinafter The European Equation].
@
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provision of open service A, commercial serviceslsafety-of-life
services/public-regulated services B, or value-added services C,
or even of final services to consumers D, in itself causes any significant harm to third-party victims. More likely, major damage
would be the result of end-users using those signals or services
and in doing so causing non-contractual damage leading to noncontractual liability.
The example here is an aircraft crash causing damage to
third party victims on the ground. Here also air law provides
the applicable rules: to the extent applicable, the 1952 Rome
Convention, and where not, national tort namely, third-party
liability regimes.76In case of system signals used in other transport sectors, there are as of yet no international regimes dealing
with third-party liability.77So, in conclusion, mutatis mutandis
national regimes likely of a general nature would apply.
In terms of product liabilities subsumed under F, liability
may be different in each instance of F represented. It will depend upon the product at issue, the potential uses to which the
actors in Figure 4 (Appendix 4) put those products, and the particular risks they entail of being harmed themselves by doing so.
They may only incidentally serve to deal with system-induced
damage. In any case, the conclusion should be that such liabilities are, so far, not dealt with by GNSS-specific product liability
law, but rather, if at all, by general product liability law normally of a national character. Only in the context of EC law has
distinct product liability law been developed at an international
level.78
What remains then are possibilities under general national
tort law to assert claims directly against the Galileo entities, in
spite of the fact that this means circumventing existing and applicable liability regimes. In other words, a passenger (con76

See Rome Convention, supra note 49.
The European Equation, supra note 75, at 240-245.
" See
Council Directive of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective
products, 85/374/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L210129); and Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states concerning liability for defective products, 1999/34/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 141120).
77
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sumer) damaged by an aircraft accident may not wish to sue the
airline (end-user) under contractual liability through D. But
when convinced that the ultimate cause of the accident is a
wrongful or absent Galileo signal or service, the passenger will
directly address the Company through torvthird-party liability
law.
This would refer especially to E-1 and E-2, where the distinction between them would justify different arguments being
applied to them. Regarding the open access signals used for the
open service under E-1, there is no contract. Regarding the
closed access signals used for the commercial services, safety-oflife services and public-regulated services under E-2, there is a
contract between key players. It is for existing national rules
and practices on tort law and third-party liability to be the basis
for whether and to what extent claims under E-1 and E-2 would
then have to be rejected by courts.
The Company could therefore only deal with liability issues
in the context of service guarantees. This depends upon the extent to which offering liability reimbursement in case the GaliLeo service could be blamed for damage would be a feasible and
interesting proposition. The Authority, the Concession Agreement, and possibly a Galileo Convention would be important in
defining the respective roles of the Authority and member states
in such arrangements. An international compensation h n d
similar to the ones used in cases of oil pollution79and by the nuclear power industry8' is an option worth considering." Such
'' International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3; and the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110
U.N.T.S. 57; both amended by the International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992
to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 18 December 1971, Nov. 27, 1992,
U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 87; Cm 2657; ATS 1996 No. 3 (entered into force 30 May 1996).
en
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Paris, July
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1968); and the Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 685 (1963); both as amended by the Convention
on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 12, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1473
(1997) (not yet entered into force).
'' See e.g., Sean. D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimes for the Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88 AM. J. INTLL. 24 , 5 6 (1994).
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arrangements are a matter for negotiation between the Galileo
Joint Undertaking (GJU), established by the European Commission and ESA inter alia to develop the concession for the future Company,82and the prospective concessionaire in the bidding process, as well as a matter of commercial policy for the
concessionaire once the bidding process is over.
As between the various Galileo services subsumed under B
in the generic Model, the major distinction between commercial
services, safety-of-life services and public-regulated services lies
in the measure of involvement of governmental authorities. This
translates into issues of sovereign immunity possibly being invoked when it comes to liability for the safety-of-life services
and the public-regulated services.
SAR services are a different issue. The role of Galileo, the
GCS and the Company will be confined to contributing to an
existing system, which means basically accepting the legal
framework already been developed throughout the life of the
COSPAS-SARSAT system. Even the role of local elements is
fundamentally circumscribed by that framework, including any
issues of liability. Thus, charting liability onto the Galileo Model
and the inclusion of local elements shows the limits of what contracts can arrange in terms of contractual versus noncontractual liability as well as the special role of product liability, which largely depends upon the actual role of the Company
and local elements in terms of producing or selling products.

VII. LIABILITY
AND INTEROPERABILITY OF GPS AND GALZLEO
The final issue to be discussed concerns that of "interoperability", that is, the fact that GPS and Galileo to a considerable
extent will provide for signals and services which can be used by
the same user. "Interoperability" in this context does not mean
the operational, economic, institutional or legal integration of
the satellite systems. Although previously considered a possible
option, the scenario of GPS and Galileo, and possibly
GLONASS, evolving into one second generation system with

See Council Regulation 876/2002JEC, supra note 9.
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shared responsibilities, liabilities and competencies, has been
abandoned.=
Therefore, for "interoperability" to have meaningful content
in the present context, it shall not presume that either A or B
will be jointly provided. What "interoperability" then refers to,
for the purposes of this paper, is the receiver level, that is, in
first instance with the value-added service providers and endusers. Value-added service providers may receive both the A
from GPS and A or B from Galileo subject to the various applicable conditions and integrate them into the service C delivered
to the end-users. Similarly, these end-users may wish to benefit
from both a t the same time for their own usage, whether these
end-users are providing services to consumers or not.
This is illustrated by Figure 5 (Appendix 5), reflecting a t
the same time the provision of signals and services, and the liability relationships attached to them.84For reasons of clarity,
as well as the indirect relevance of product liability for interoperability, some of the F-arrows have been shortened. They
should be read as extending as far as they did in Figures 2 (Appendix 2) and 4 (Appendix 4). Here, GPS and EGNOS have been
specifically mentioned next to Galileo as examples of basic signal providers and augmentation providers.
As a consequence of this paper's definition of "interoperability", the generic liability charts depicted for GPS (Figure 2, Appendix 2) and Galileo (Figure 4, Appendix 4) will continue to
apply in the case of GPS-Galileo interoperability (Figure 5, Appendix 5). GPS will continue to provide A, just as Galileo will
provide A and B, the difference being that they are now being
received by the same receiver simultaneously. This is likely to
be transparent to the value-added service provider or end-user.
It is unlikely that either would be interested in such visibility
either, until liability (and hence, for Galileo, service guarantees)
would become an issue.
The extent to which the U.S. authorities would accept liability for GPS-related accidents remains as described above.
This liability is a U.S. domestic matter: claims have to be enter83

84

See, e.g., Schubert, supra note 8, at 248-50.
See Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 108.
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tained in U.S. courts in accordance with U.S. law. The possibility to sue the U.S. government successfully meets with some
severe statutory and practical limitations. Therefore, arguably
the U.S. authorities perhaps may not be expected to put a lot of
effort into distinguishing GPS input from Galileo input unless
they would perceive a substantial risk of being held liable for
cases of damage where the respective inputs from GPS and
Galileo would not be clearly distinguishable. Of course, GPS
being a national U.S. asset, in the absence of any contract, U.S.
authorities are fully entitled to ensure that only national regimes and procedures can be used for claiming liability for damage ultimately caused by GPS, and resist any call for wider liability-acceptance such as, for example, by means of a GNSS
Convention. It is then, equally obvious, for any potential user to
determine his own risks in doing so, and if such risks are considered unwarranted, to desist from using GPS.
Similarly, the authorities under which the Company resorts
to may limit its (non-contractual) liability to that imposed by
the relevant national regimes, which will be the case for the
open service. By contrast, for the contractual services, it is currently assumed that under the concession the Company should
accept a certain additional liability through the contract, but
not confined to contractual liability-proper. Apart from such
contractual liability, the contracts with value-added service providers should, under current assumptions, allow for derogation
of non-contractual liability. For those reasons, the Company
should ensure that its input to a dual receiver is recognisable, in
order not to risk paying compensation when GPS would be responsible for damage.
There is an additional issue of non-contractual tort liability
a t stake here. Circumventing any contract, whether concerning
GPS or Galileo, third-party claimants may wish to ignore the
contractual chain, which would cause them to sue only the
value-added service providers or end-users that directly caused
the damage and instead assert a claim directly against the signal provideds). Leaving aside the question of the possibilities in
any legal system to have such a claim accepted, such a case
would require Galileo to prove that in the "interoperation" of
GPS and Galileo signals and services it is the GPS input that
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was responsible, if the CompanyIGCS is to avoid paying unjust
compensation. This would amount to a serious defence in court,
and the issue of evidentiary value of technical means of monitoring.
Whilst the A and B of GPS and Galileo may "interoperate"
a t the receiver level, by the time it comes to C, the respective
inputs of GPS and Galileo are indistinguishable. Nor need they
be distinguishable from a legal, including a liability, perspective. C, being a matter of contract, is for the contracting parties
to decide whether they want to deal with such interoperation, or
not. This is the more likely case because the end-user is more
interested in being provided with a certain service rather than
in knowing the technical requirements of the service. The Company might be interested in ensuring that also on liability the
benefits of using Galileo will partly accrue to both contracting
parties, by ensuring in its contracts with any of those that any
liability within C may be derogated to the Galileo Core System
to the extent Galileo is ultimately to blame for the damage a t
issue.
Going still further down the chain of relevant relationships
and ensuing liabilities as illustrated by Figures 2, 4 and 5, Appendices 2 , 4 and 5) as a consequence of the foregoing, neither in
D, nor in E, nor in F does any "interoperation" of GPS and GaliLeo at the receiver level have any impact on liability as different
from liabilities which would anyway exist. D concerns a contractual liability, which would a t best lead Galileo to undertake the
same derogation offer to be provided regarding C, as described
above. E concerns non-contractual liability; but where it concerns E-3, E-4 and E-5, mutatis mutandis the same applies: applicable derogation could be offered through the contractual
chain.
On the other hand E-1 and E-2 apply to a preinteroperation phase, where consequently the issue of interoperability-liability is not posed. At the same time, both E-1 arrows are similar in referring to open access signals in the context of which contracts are totally absent. Whereas both E-2 arrows refer to controlled access signals where contracts, namely
under various versions of B, would crucially be a t issue. This
distinction may have a bearing on whether liability claims along
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these lines would be easily accepted in the presence of other
possibilities or absence thereof to sue under A or B.
Finally, F concerns product liability, and to the extent neither GPS nor Galileo have a role in manufacturing the involved
products, this kind of liability will not be a relevant issue. In
case manufacturers would be directly contracted by the Galileo
Core System to manufacture hardware, the situation again becomes similar to the previous ones: product liability resting on
the manufacturer not going away merely because of such a contract, the contract may be used by the Galileo Core System for
offering derogation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the analysis and Model have shown, under current law
the situation with respect to liability for global navigation satellite systems operations is still fairly simple at the abstract level,
that is, which liability regimes might or do apply. However,
statements of certainty might have to wait until a proper case
which represents a first instance where various national regimes, basically of all states on whose territory or by whose citizens global navigation satellite systems services are made use
of. It may be expected however that for GPS, no contractual liability would be accepted, whereas in the absence of international treaties stipulating otherwise non-contractual liability
claims would only be possible under U.S. tort law, where the
few statutes mentioned would severely limit the possibilities for
successful claims in this respect.
Even with GPS, however, that is not the full story, as from
a civil perspective a t least the applications downstream are
more important. This is where the area of sector-specific liability regimes become relevant such as, the largely international
one of contractual liability and the partly international one of
third-party liability in air law. Whilst for GPS authorities such
liabilities may be less relevant, for the measure of interest in
the downstream applications sectors such liabilities to a considerable extent determine the interest, feasibility and ultimately,
perhaps, the commercial viability of using GPS.
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That is where Galileo will come in, representing a quantum
leap in operational as well as legal complexity precisely. Because for Galileo, contrary to GPS and as evidenced also by the
private operator in the centre of the Galileo institutional structure, a major justification for its future existence lies in attracting and serving downstream applications: aviation and other
transport sectors as well as telecommunications, leisure activities, urban planning, banking and suchlike.
Dealing with liability in a customer-oriented fashion is part
of that approach. In principle, the Model applicable to the liability issues works no differently for Galileo than it does for GPS.
Thus, for the open service, principally similar to GPS's SPS, no
liability would be accepted other than general tort or third-party
liability under applicable national regimes. For the other services, commercial services, safety-of-life services and publicregulated services, Galileo could have chosen the same approach, but it likely will not. In order to entice downstream
value-added service providers, end-users and ultimately also
consumers properly speaking into using Galileo. It may be expected Galileo will offer under relevant contracts and through
service guarantees certain contractual liabilities to reimburse
downstream contractual partners under applicable contractual
or non-contractual liability regimes if they would be forced to
pay for claims to their contractual partners, third-party victims.
The damage leading to such compensatory payments has to be
proven to have been ultimately caused by erroneous or absent
Galileo signals.
What this means in terms of substantive liability obligations and consequences downstream, however, is a totally different matter, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Such obligations and consequences would depend on whether and how
any of the plethora of relevant liability regimes would apply.
This paper addresses a theoretical and general perspective of
liability regimes relevant for any sector involved in any national
jurisdiction where global navigation satellite system applications would be feasible, plus a few international and European
Community law-regimes.
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Figure 1. The Legal/Functional Model of GNSS (GPS) signal
and service provision.
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Figure 2. The GNSS (GPS) LegaVFunctional Model and
liability.
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Figure 3. The LegaWunctional Model of Galileo signal and
service provision (generic and envisaged).
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Figure 4. The Galileo LegalIFunctional Model and liability.
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Figure 5. Interoperability of GPS and Galileo, and liability.
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